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OCTOBER TERM, 1976 
No. 76-1701 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, 
v. Petitioner, 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR., ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, DONALD S. 
COHEN, THE AUDUBON COUNCIL OF TENNESSEE, INC., 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEASTERN BIOLOGISTS, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
INC., AS AMICUS CURIAE IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
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No. 76-1701 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, 
v. Petitioner, 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR., ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, DONALD S. 
COHEN, THE AUDUBON COUNCIL OF TENNESSEE, INC.p 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEASTERN BIOLOGISTS, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
INC., AS AMICUS CURIAE IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
The Natural Resources Defense Council, a national 
environmental protection organization, is filing this brief 
as an amicus curiae to argue that this Court should deny 
certiorari. This brief is filed with the consent of the 
parties, as evidenced by letters from their counsel which 
have been filed with the Clerk. 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The interest of the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) arises from the interest of its members in the 
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protection of endangered and threatened species and con-
servation of other genetic resources. NRDC is a national 
membership organization dedicated to the preservation 
and defense of the human environment and natural re-
sources of the United States. NRDC's members cur-
rently total over 25,000, including members in Tennessee 
who would be directly affected by reversal of the Sixth 
Circuit's decision and members in all the other States 
who would benefit from strict enforcement of the En-
dangered Species Act. 
ARGUMENT 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that pe-
titioner's completion of Tellico Dam would violate § 7 
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 
(Supp. V 1973) by destroying critical habitat of the 
snail darter, a fish listed by the Department of the In-
terior as an endangered species. It found that continued 
Congressional appropriations for the Tellico Project did 
not exempt the Project from the Act. The Court thus re-
versed the decision of the District Court and permanently 
enjoined "all activities incident to the Tellico Project 
which may destroy or modify the critical habitat of the 
shail darter" until "Congress, by appropriate legislation, 
exempts Tellico from compliance with the Act, or the 
snail darter has been deleted from the list of endangered 
species or its critical habitat materially redefined." 549 
F.2d at 1075. 
This cage presents no novel or important questions of 
/ law, nor does it conflict with decisions from other cir-
euits. It was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals. 
This Court, therefore, should deny certiorari. See Sup. 
et. R. 19 (1). 
~ .... 
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1. 
THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CIR· 
CUlTS CONCERNING REPEAL OF SUBSTANTIVE 
LAW BY CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS 
Petitioner argues that statements in the House and 
Senate Appropriations Committee reports for the Tellico 
Project demonstrate the intent of Congress to exempt the 
Project from The Endangered Species Act. (Petition 
at 7-8, 13.) This Court however, has held in a line of 
cases dating from 1883 that appropriations statutes re-
peal substantive law only if the appropriations statute 
itself contains a specific expression of intent to repeal. 
"The whole question depends on the intention of Congress 
as expressed in the statutes." (Emphasis supplied.) 
United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146, 150 (1883).1 
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's claim that 
the language of the committee reports for the appropria-
tions act impliedly repealed the Endangered Species Act 
as to the Tellico Project. Since there was no specific 
language in the act itself expressing an intent to exempt 
the Tellico Project, the Court of Appeals was plainly 
correct. 
Petitioner further claims that the circuits diverge on 
the . issue of repeal by appropriations statutes, some 
"view [ing] appropriations legislation as virtually incom-
petent evidence on congressional intent" and others 
Hrecogniz[ing] its relevance." (Petition at 20.) None 
of the cases cited by petitioner, however, supports the 
existence of such a conflict. In United States v. Dickerson, 
310 U.S. 554 (1940), this Court reversed a decision 
by the Court of Claims awarding the defendant, under 
a 1922 statute, a bonus for reenlisting within three 
1 See also United States v. Vulte, 233 U.S. 509 (1914); United 
States v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389 (1886) . 
'~. 
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months after an honorable discharge. This Court held 
that he was prevented from receiving his bonus because 
apPl'Opl'iations measures in effect at the time of his re-
enlistment expressly denied the bonus notwithstanding 
the 1922 act.a Repeal therefore occurred because it was 
specifically mandated in the appropriations law and "the 
earlier and later statutes [were] irreconcilable." Morton 
V. Mancari, 417 U.S. 586,650 (1974). 
Friends of the Earth v. Arnwtrong, 486 F.2d 1 (10th 
elr. 1978),cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974), and 
Envil'omnental DefenB8 Fund v. Corp8 of Engineers, 492 
F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1974), the other cases cited by 
petitionel' as directly supporting its position, are also 
inapposite. In Friends of the Earth, a statute which 
prohibited any dam or reservoir from being constructed 
within a national monument was held repealed as to 
the Rainbow Bridge N aUonal Monument because of ex-
pressions of intent to exempt in twelve separate appropri-
ations statutes between 1962 and 1978.a The Environ-
• The appropriations measure provided Hthat 'no part of any 
appropriation contained in this or any other Act for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1939, shall be available for the payment' of 
any enlistment allowance tor 're·enlistments made during the fiscal 
f~1U' ending June 3D, 1930, notwithstanding the applicable porti(ms 
of sections (} and 10' of the Actof June 10, 11)22." 310 U.S. at 55tJ. 
I The 1966 Colorado River Storage Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 et seq., 
provided, in part, that H[iJt is the intention of Congress that no 
dam or reservoir constructed under the authorization of this Act 
IJhall be within any national park or monument." It later became 
apparent that the wa-te1'8 of Lake Powell, which was to be created 
by the Glen Canyon Dam authorized by the Storage Act, would 
partially flood the Rainbow Bridge National Monument. The twelve 
appropriations acts Included this proviso: "Provided, That no part 
of the funds herein apPl'opriated shall be available for construction 
or operation of tacilities to prevent waters of Lake Powell from 
onterinr any National Monument." The court held that the Storall'6 
Act therefore did not apply to the Rainbow Bridie National Monu· 
"'~.' '" mont. 486 F.24 at. G·8. 
~}.~~~~ :: " 
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mental Defense Fund case did not even address the issue 
of repeal of substantive law by appropriations measures.· 
In short, decisions of this Court and the courts of ap-
peals on this issue are consistent, and there is no need 
to resolve any inconsistency. 
II. 
THE DECISION BELOW TO ENFORCE THE EN· 
DANGERED SPECIES ACT BY INJUNCTION PRE· 
SENTS NO IMPORTANT QUESrION UNDER THE 
ACT 
Petitioner takes issue with the Sixth Circuit's holding 
that petitioner's violation of the Endangered Species Act 
necessitates injunctive relief, arguing that the courts 
must balance the benefits of completing the TelUco 
Project against the Congressional policies set forth in the 
Endangered Specie's Act in order to dete'rmine whether 
an injunction should issue. The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that resolution of such a controversy, involving competing 
public policies, is properly left to the Congress. This 
.. decision is consistent with established law and does not 
present a "significant question" as alleged by petitioner. 
(Petition, p. 28.) 
This Court has repeatedly held that when a federal 
statute is being violated, a final injunction will issue 'to 
prevent continued injury. In United State8 v. San Fran-
• The Fifth Circuit held there that the Corps had fully complied 
with the procedural requirements of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. f 4331 et seq. (1970), and that CongreSB 
after evaluating the environmental Impact statement, had decided 
to continue funding. No question of the project's e~emption from 
the Act was Involved. "Several courts have Indicated that Jellislative 
appropriations should not be construed to constitute an Implied 
repeal of the duties Imposed on agencies by NEPA ... However, 
these authorltieR do not Rpeak to the clrcumRtances of this case." 
492 F .2d at 1141. 
, ) 
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cisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), this Court held that an in-
junction to prevent continued misuse of federal lands 
should issue because the "course of conduct [was] for-
bidden by law," 310 U.S. at 28, and an equity court has 
the responsibility "to make a declared policy of Congress 
effective." 310 U.S. at 31. Accord, United States v. 
Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 167 (1890). 
Numerous lower court decisions are to the same effect. 
This Court recently denied certiprari in NatWnal Wild-
life Federation v. Colem.a,n, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cit. 1976), 
em. denied, 97 S. Ct. 489 (1977), in which an injunc-
tion was issued to enforce the Endangered Species Act 
without any balancing of competing public values. See 
also Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 891-93 
(D.C. Cir.),C9rt. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973); Lathan 
v. Volpe, 455F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1972); Fleming v. 
Moberly Milk PrOM. Co., 160 F.2d 259, 270-71 (D.C. 
eir.), eert. denied, 331 U.S. 786 (1947); Buscaglw. v. 
DiBtrictCo'Urt of SanJuan, 145 F.2d 274, 287 (1st eir. 
1944), cert. d8ni6d, 823 U.S. 793 (1945). 
·, ..... ,. : .. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the petition by Tennessee V al-
ley Authority for a writ of certiorari should be denied • 
Respectfully submitted, • 
THOMAS B. STOEL, JR. ' 
(Member of Supreme Court Bar) 
SUEDEEN M. GmBONS 
Attorneys for Nat.ural Resources 
Defense Cou'Mil, Inc. 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 
COUNCIL, INC. 
917 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 737-5000 
